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At the end of one of his great farces, Shakespeare's King of France
assures us that "[a]ll is well ended, if this suit be won."' But lawyers
know that the ways in which outcomes are achieved may themselves
have precedential effects on future procedures. Even a tolerable outcome
in a particular case may yield long-term consequences that bedevil efforts
at public order. This possibility is the detritus of the PLO Mission affair.
All may have ended well. Before we congratulate ourselves on the opera-
tion of justice, however, we should reflect on all the lamentable behavior
that precipitated the crisis and on all the ill-considered actions that
helped to resolve it.
To understand the facts, we must begin over forty years ago. In 1947,
the United States and the United Nations, newly established in New
York City, concluded what has come to be known as the Headquarters
Agreement. 2 The Agreement sets out the basic rights and obligations of
each of the parties and constitutes an indispensable part of the environ-
ment necessary for an organization which, although international, must
maintain and operate its headquarters within the territory of a single
state. The Agreement was quite comprehensive and included a dispute
settlement procedure. 3 By a joint resolution of August 4, 1947, Congress
authorized the President to bring the Agreement into effect. 4 Congress
anticipated that the Agreement would be interpreted in the course of its
implementation, and that this might involve some changes. Hence its
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1. W. SHAKESPEARE, ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS WELL, epilogue, line 2.
2. Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States of America Regarding
the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 756, T.I.A.S. No, 1676, 11
U.N.T.S. 11 (1947) [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement].
3. Id. § 21. See infra text accompanying notes 49-54.
4. Joint Resolution of Aug. 4, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-357, 61 Stat. 756 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 287 app. at 101 (1982)).
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authorization included an empowerment to conclude "such changes
therein not contrary to the general tenor thereof and not imposing any
additional obligations on the United States as the President may deem
necessary and appropriate .... 5
Section 11 of the Headquarters Agreement obliged the various levels of
authority within the United States not to impose impediments to transit
from or to the Headquarters District upon representatives of members,
officials of the United Nations, experts performing missions, representa-
tives of the press, representatives of non-governmental organizations rec-
ognized by the Organization and "other persons invited to the
Headquarters District by the United Nations .... -6
Early in its history, the General Assembly began to invite observers to
its meetings-some for brief terms, some for longer terms.7 These ob-
servers have become important and sometimes indispensable participants
in the work of the United Nations.8 In a relatively short period of time,
the status of "Permanent Observer" was established and recognized. The
U.S. Government has routinely provided the benefits of the Headquarters
Agreement to these Permanent Observers, on the common understand-
ing that they fell within Section 1 's category of "other persons invited to
the Headquarters District."
In 1974, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was invited by
the General Assembly to "participate in the sessions and the work of the
5. Id.
6. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 2, § 11. Section 11 provides in full:
The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impedi-
ments to transit to or from the Headquarters District of (1) representatives of Members or
officials of the United Nations or of specialized agencies as defined in Article 57, para-
graph 2, of the Charter, or the families of such representatives or officials, (2) experts
performing missions for the United Nations or for such specialized agencies, (3) repre-
sentatives of the press, or of radio, film or other information agencies, who have been
accredited by the United Nations (or by such a specialized agency) in its discretion after
consultation with the United States, (4) representatives of non-governmental organiza-
tions recognized by the United Nations for the purpose of consultation under Article 71
of the Charter, or (5) other persons invited to the headquarters district by the United
Nations or by such specialized agency on official business.
7. See, e.g., Observer status for the South West Africa People's Organization, G.A. Res. 31/
152, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 136, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); Observer status for the
Islamic Conference at the United Nations, G.A. Res. 3369, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at
3, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Status of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in the
General Assembly, G.A. Res. 3209, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, G.A.
Res. 2011, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
8. For a good history of observer status, see Suy, The Status of Observers in International
Organizations, in 160 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 75
(1978).
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General Assembly in the capacity of observer." 9 The PLO established an
Observer Mission, and since that time has maintained a permanent office
in New York City. The PLO is listed in U.N. publications as a member
of a category of" 'organizations which have received a standing invita-
tion from the General Assembly to participate in the sessions and the
work of the General Assembly as observers.' "10
Shortly after the invitation was extended, the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defa-
mation League, a private organization in the United States,"' sought to
enjoin the U.S. Government from granting visas to members of the PLO.
A District Court rejected the request on the ground that the United
States was obliged to issue visas on the basis of its obligations in the
Headquarters Agreement. 12
There the matter rested until public opinion in the United States was
aroused by the Achille Lauro incident in 1987, in which Palestinian "ir-
regulars" seized an Italian cruise ship with the intention of using it for an
operation against Israel. The mission went awry; in the course of its con-
clusion, the Palestinians murdered a passenger, an elderly American con-
fined to a wheel chair. 13 In December, 1987, in the face of resistance
from the Reagan Administration, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1987.14 Section 1003 of the Act provided:
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups, any successor
* to any of those, or any agents thereof, on or after the effective date
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish or
maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other facilities or establish-
ments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest or direction
9. Observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organization, G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
10. This is how the ICJ characterized the PLO in its recent case, Applicability of the
Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement of
26 June, 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, 15 (Advisory Opinion of Apr. 26, 1988) (quoting U.N. publica-
tions) [hereinafter ICJ Advisory Opinion].
11. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of B'nai B'rith is a civil rights association
founded in 1913. The ADL was established "[t]o stop the defamation of Jewish people and to
secure justice and fair treatment to all citizens alike." 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS
1334 (1988).
12. Anti-Defamation League v. Kissinger, No. 74 Civ. 1545 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 1974),
reprinted in part in 1974 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27.
13. For descriptions of the Achille Lauro incident, see Gooding, Fighting Terrorism in the
1980's: The Interception of the Achille Lauro Hiackers, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 158, 164-68
(1987); McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implicationsfor International Law, 52 TENN. L.
REV. 691 (1985).
14. Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1406 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 5201-




of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Organization or any
of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any agents thereof.15
The original targets of this legislation were the PLO Observer Mission
in New York and the PLO information office in Washington, D.C. This
was clear from the final text of the bill as well as from statements made
on the floor of each house when revisions of the bill were introduced in
late April and May 1987.16 In September, 1987, the Executive Branch
ordered the PLO to close its information office in Washington, D.C. in
the hope of placating Congress and arresting the progress of the Anti-
Terrorism Act. 17 Congress was not dissuaded, however, and when the
Act was incorporated into a larger omnibus appropriations bill in Octo-
ber, 1987,18 now exclusively targeting the PLO Mission, the President
signed it, despite continuing misgivings about the Act's legality. 19
Even though the U.N. Secretariat believed that the implementation of
the Anti-Terrorism Act would violate the Headquaters Agreement, it
was unable to secure from the United States a commitment to refrain
from implementing the Act.20 Nor could the United Nations persuade.
the United States to cooperate in initiating arbitration in accordance with
the Agreement's dispute resolution mechanism. 21 When negotiations
deadlocked, the General Assembly entered the picture. At the conclu-
sion of a special session convened to deal with the impending application
of the U.S. statute, the General Assembly resolved that the Anti-Terror-
ism Act was inconsistent with the United States' obligations to the
United Nations under the Headquarters Agreement. 22 The General As-
sembly asked the International Court of Justice to issue an Advisory
Opinion on whether the United States was obliged to participate in arbi-
15. Id. § 1003 (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202 (West Supp. 1988)).
16. For the legislative history of the Anti-Terrorism Act, see 133 CONG. REC. E1635-36
(daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987); 133 CONG. REC. S6448-51 (daily ed. May 14, 1987); 133 CONG. REC.
H4047-48 (daily ed. May 28, 1987);.133 CONG. Rc. H4198 (daily ed. June 3, 1987).
17. See P.L.O. Backers Ordered to Close Capital Office, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1987, at Al,
col. 1; Washington Talk: State Department; Ousting the P.L.O., N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1988, at
A24, col. 4; P.L.O. Given 6 More Weeks to Close Washington Office, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1987, at A8, col. 1.
18. The Anti-Terrorism Act was added without hearings as a rider to the Foreign Rela-
tions Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988-89. See 133 CONG. REc. S13,851 (daily ed. Oct.
8, 1987). The Anti-Terrorism Act was briefly discussed during a joint conference on the For-
eign Relations Authorization Act, during which the House conferees acceded to the Senate's
version. See 133 CONG. Rc. S18,193 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987).
19. See the articles cited at supra note 17.
20. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 17-20.
21. Id. at 19-22.
22. G.A. Res. 229A, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by General Assembly at its Forty-
Second Session (29 February - 2 March 1988), U.N. Doc. GA/7612/Add.1 (9 March 1988) at
1, reprinted in part in ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 21.
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tration as requested by the United Nations pursuant to the Headquarters
Agreement's dispute resolution clause. 23
On March 11, 1988, ten days before the Act's effective date and while
the ICJ opinion was pending, the Department of Justice informed the
PLO Observer Mission that it would have to close. 24 The PLO refused
to comply and indicated that it would resist the demand for closure. The
Justice Department then initiated an action to secure the closure of the
Mission, as the statute prescribed, in the Federal District Court of the
Southern District of New York. While that case was pending, the Inter-
national Court issued a unanimous opinion, confirming the General As-
sembly's conclusion that the Act violated the Headquarters Agreement,
and that the United States was obliged to commence arbitration.25
Shortly afterwards, the Federal District Court in which the Depart-
ment of Justice had filed suit ruled, per Judge Edmund L. Palmieri, that
congressionally-mandated closure of the PLO Mission would indeed con-
stitute a violation of the Headquarters Agreement, and that, as Congress
had not explicitly indicated an intention to violate the Agreement, courts
were to assume that it had not intended to do so. Thus, the Court found
against the Department of Justice.26
On August 29, 1988, the Reagan Administration decided not to appeal
the decision,27 effectively terminating the United States' effort to close
the PLO Mission and avoiding what apparently all had conceded would
have been a violation by the United States of its obligations to the United
Nations. The curtain rang down on the PLO Mission case.
I
The principal villain of this farce was the U.S. Congress. Congress
enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 with scant concern either for the
international political consequences of its actions or, at least for many of
its members, for the Act's incompatibility with an international obliga-
tion previously undertaken by the United States. It is difficult to escape
23. G.A. Res. 229B, Resolutions and Decisions Adopted by General Assembly at its Forty-
Second Session (29 February -2 March 1988), U.N. Doc. GA/7612/Add.1 (9 March 1988) at
3, reprinted in part in ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 13.
24. Letter from U.S. Attorney General Meese to Chief of the PLO Observer Mission to the
U.N. (Mar. 11, 1988), cited in United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 88 Civ. 1962,
slip op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1988).
25. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 35.
26. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., slip. op. at 35.





the conclusion that many of the movers of the legislation were acting
from motives of sheer opportunism.28
The recent development of a new flexibility on the part of the Palestini-
ans and certain tentative initiatives by close associates of Yassir Arafat,
culminating in the PLO's acceptance of Resolution 242,29 presented unu-
sual opportunities for the Executive. These opportunities were under-
mined by the Anti-Terrorism Act which, had it been implemented, could
well have ended them. Congress' concern for internal security is cer-
tainly well-founded, and it is far too late in our constitutional history to
bicker about whether action of this sort is an infringement of an exclusive
Executive power. Congress increasingly and probably irreversibly partic-
ipates in foreign affairs. The pertinent question is no longer whether it
should be doing so, but whether it is doing so responsibly and with an
appropriate level of competence.
There was no evidence that the PLO Mission was either a headquar-
ters or instrument of terror in the United States or elsewhere. Helping
neither the Executive nor the fight against terrorism, Congress managed
to weaken the credibility of American treaty commitments and to offend
the U.N. Secretariat and almost every delegation to the United Nations.
Incidents like this one leave a residue of bad feeling, which hardly helps
the Executive conduct foreign relations.
It was of little concern to its drafters that the legislation would have
violated an international agreement. Despite Judge Palmieri's opinion,
there was no question that such was its intention and consequence. This
lack of concern is particularly disappointing in a Congress that has, of
late, frequently alleged Executive departures from treaties to which the
Senate had advised and consented, 30 and has preached, with a thunder-
ing righteousness, about the need for faithful implementation of the inter-
national commitments this nation undertakes.
28. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. S6448 (daily ed. May 14, 1987) ("This organization, and its
personnel, have no place in America; they have no place in civilized society. It's time they
were banished.") (remarks of Senator Dole); id. at 86449 ("[T]he Constitution is not at issue;
the United Nations is not at issue; the Middle East peace process is not at issue. Terrorism is
the issue.") (remarks of Senator Dole); 133 CONG. REC. H4047 (daily ed. May 28, 1987) ("I
urge my colleagues to join me in this effort to rid America of one of the world's most notorious
terrorist organizations, a group which has no place in a free country such as ours.") (remarks
of Representative Herger).
29. S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR RESOLUTIONS AND DECISIONS at 8, U.N. Doe. S/INF/
22/Rev.2 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.N.Y.B. 257 (resolution "guaranteeing the territorial invi-
olability and political independence of every State in the [Middle East] area," the PLO's ac-
ceptance of which has long been considered by both Israel and United States to be a
prerequisite for peace negotiations).
30. Senate Committee Threatens Delay of New Arms Pact, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1987, at
Al, col. 6; In a Setback to Reagan's Policy, House Votes to Halt Nuclear Tests, N.Y. Times,
May 20, 1987, at A10, col. 3.
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II
The second villain of the farce was the Justice Department. Faced
with legislation that violated an important treaty, the Executive initially
acquiesced, without much conviction, agreeing that section 11 of the
Headquarters Agreement, by its terms, did not require the toleration of
permanent observer missions.31 But even a first-year law student knows
that after forty-one years of intensive application of an instrument, the
practice that has illuminated the text is as important as the text itself.
Indeed, the congressional authorization of the Agreement had contem-
plated and endorsed such developments, and some three decades of prac-
tice had surely established it.
The content of the international obligation was actually of little impor-
tance to the Department of Justice. The Department acknowledged the
violation which the Anti-Terrorism Act would cause, and then indicated
that it would nonetheless enforce the legislation. Attorney General Ed-
win Meese said:
I am aware of your position that requiring closure of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization ("PLO") Observer Mission violates our obligations under
the United Nations ("UN") Headquarters Agreement and, thus, interna-
tional law. However, among a number of grounds in support of our action,
the United States Supreme Court has held for more than a century that
Congress has the authority to override treaties and, thus, international law
for the purpose of domestic law. Here Congress has chosen, irrespective of
international law, to ban the presence of all PLO offices in this country,
including the presence of the PLO Observer Mission to the United Nations.
In discharging my obligation to enforce the law, the only responsible course
available to me is to respect and follow that decision. 32
The Constitution does not in haec verba superordinate subsequent leg-
islation over prior treaties with which it may be incompatible: It states
simply that the Constitution, treaties and statutes comprise our law with-
out indicating which might take precedence in case of conflict. The nine-
teenth-century judicial creation of the so-called "last in time rule,"'33 to
which the Attorney General referred and which is actually much more
31. State Department Adviser Says Shutting P.L.O. Mission Would Break Law, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 1.
32. Letter of March 21, 1988 from U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese to the Permanent
Observer of the PLO to the United Nations, reprinted in part in ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra
note 10, at 24.
33. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600, 602 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884). See also Henkin, The
Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny,
100 HARv. L. REV. 853 (1987) (reviews Chinese Exclusion Case and its progeny within con-




complicated than he suggested, was fashioned long before modem inter-
national law and, in particular, before the rise of public international
organizations.
Context is important in understanding and construing any communi-
cation. It is one thing to authorize Congress to override in simple fash-
ion a bilateral treaty in the international political context of the
nineteenth century. It is quite another to authorize Congress to override
an agreement with the most inclusive international organization in the
international political context of the late twentieth century. Apparently
no one in the Justice Department inquired whether an American court
had ever been asked to decide if Congress can selectively override treaty-
assumed host obligations to an international organization. To cite the
old rule without reference to the modern context, and to rest its authority
simply on the fact that it is old, is about as relevant as citing Plessy v.
Ferguson34 as an adequate support for segregation during the litigation of
Brown v. Board of Education.35
The Department of Justice was not alone. The New York Times
weighed into the matter by supporting the Justice Department, which it
rarely does, and proclaiming that "[t]he Justice Department in fact has
no license to disobey domestic law and should not be encouraged to do
so.' ' 36 The Academy also appeared to agree. Professor Glennon, in a
letter to the New York Times, argued that when Congress violates inter-
national law-by adopting legislation which is at odds with an existing
international obligation-both the Executive and the Courts must imple-
ment that violation.37
The conception of law underlying all these views was distorted. The
"last in time" rule, according to which inconsistencies between earlier
and later legislation are resolved in favor of the later, is little more than a
good-housekeeping practice-as long as one is concerned only with legis-
lation. But in a system of separation of powers and checks and balances,
particularly in the foreign affairs area, which is characterized by an intri-
cate network of sequential checks and counter-checks, it would indeed be
peculiar if a momentous competence such as the overriding of a solemn
commitment engaging the faith and credit of the United States with an-
other government could be accomplished by a simple and routine major-
34. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
35. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Looking Foolish on the P.L.O., N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at A38, col. 1 (editorial).
37. Glennon, White House Can't Disregard Law on P.L.O., N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1988, at
A22, col. 4 (Letter to the editor). See also T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 113 (1987) (discussing the "last in time" principle); L. HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 221-22 (1972).
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ity vote of a single Branch, a vote which is then embedded in an omnibus
legislation which the Executive cannot selectively veto but must take or
leave as an indivisible entity.3 8
The so-called "last in time" rule is often described in grossly oversim-
plified terms. A special judicial hermeneutic has been developed and ap-
plied under the rubric of "last in time" when the conflict is between a
treaty and subsequent legislation. The basic, although unstated, princi-
ple is judicial preeminence: The law in these matters, to paraphrase John
Chipman Gray, is what the courts say.39 The judge endeavors to "ac-
commodate" the apparently divergent texts. Accommodation is often a
euphemism for trying to "shoe-horn" the statute into the treaty. The fit
can be preposterously tight.4° There is a very strong presumption, and
until the PLO case a rebuttable one, that the treaty prevails, i.e., that
Congress did not intend to violate the treaty, unless an intention manifest
on the face of the legislation indicates that such a violation was the un-
mistakable congressional purpose. In interpreting a given statute, the
courts have assumed a very broad interpretative competence. And some
"interpretations" have substantially refashioned the statute in a way
alien to its apparent or "plain and natural" intention. In sum, judges
have reserved a potentially very broad power to determine if and how the
statute is to coexist with the international commitment. In some cases,
the violation has been upheld and effected.41 In other cases, it has not.42
38. See Reisman & McDougal, Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?, NAT'L
L.J., May 21, 1979, at 19; Reisman & McDougal, Can the President Unilaterally End Trea-
ties?, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1979, at 17 (Constitution requires balancing of congressional and
presidential powers in terminating international agreements such as 1954 U.S.-Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty).
39. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 115-16 (1909) ("[W]e have
seen that the law is made up of the rules for decision which the courts lay down; ... the judges
are rather the creators than the discoverers of the law.").
40. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 88 Civ. 1962, slip op. at 18-21
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1988); Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) ("It will not be
presumed that the legislative department of the government will lightly pass laws which are in
conflict with the treaties of the country.").
41. See, e.g., Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (act forbidding petitioner from
entering United States which was in conflict with prior treaties between United States and
China must be given effect by courts); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (statute levying.
duty on captain for each non-citizen passenger arriving by ship in U.S. port is valid despite
numerous treaties permitting immigration); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616
(1870) (act imposing tax on liquor and tobacco "produced anywhere within the exterior
boundaries of the United States" applies to Cherokee territories notwithstanding prior treaty
exempting all products from taxation).
42. See, e.g., Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains .... ."); United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 88 Civ.
1962, slip op. at 18-21 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1988). See also Henkin, supra note 33, at 872
("After the notorious instance of the Chinese exclusion acts, Congress has only infrequently
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The Executive Branch must also interpret statutes which conflict with
international agreements. In cases of irreconcilable discrepancies be-
tween international commitments and statutes, some great presidents
have responded directly on the basis of their own constitutional author-
ity: Lincoln disregarded Congress' instruction regarding termination of
the Rush-Bagot Agreement; 43 Wilson simply refused to implement a stat-
ute on the grounds that it was an invalid attempt to usurp his foreign
affairs authority. 44
The potential violation in the PLO case was at least as serious as these
earlier instances; if effected, the Anti-Terrorism Act would have forced
the Executive to violate the Headquarters Agreement, an obligation in
which every other Member State of the United Nations had an interest.
The near unanimity of condemnation in the General Assembly resolution
indicated how wide and deep the international indignation was.
45
Although Attorney General Meese and the New York Times implied that
the Executive had no choice but to comply, the Executive could have
resolved the issue on the domestic level in ways which would have cre-
ated a sounder precedent for future cases.
Consider the situation from the President's perspective. The Head-
quarters Agreement required the President to allow the Mission to oper-
ate. Congress was requiring the President to close the Mission. The
international law of state responsibility was telling the President, because
of his status under the Constitution and his status as the designated agent
for foreign affairs, that if he closed the Mission, he would have to repair
the violation committed by his Government, i.e., allow the Mission to
reopen. At such a level of normative dissonance, the President could
have informed Congress that, in his view, the statute was unimplement-
able. He then could have invited Congress, if it disagreed with his judg-
disregarded treaty obligations, and courts have striven to interpret statutes to avoid inconsis-
tency with treaty obligations.") (footnote omitted).'
43. See SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. 9, 52d Cong., 2d Sess. 24-32 (1892), cited in M. McDou-
GAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 598 n.131 (1960) (President Lincoln
withdrew notification of termination of Rush-Bagot Convention of 1817, which limited naval
armament on the Great Lakes, despite congressional resolution ratifying original decision to
terminate treaty).
44. See W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 24 (1941) (President
Wilson refused to terminate treaties restricting U.S. ability to impose discriminating customs
duties on imports as Congress had required in § 34 of Merchant Marine Act of 1920).
45. The General Assembly resolution declaring that the United States violated the Head-
quarters Agreement by passing the ATA was adopted by 143 votes to 1, with no abstentions.
Israel voted against the resolution, and the United States announced that it was not participat-
ing in the vote. See United Nations Press Release, U.N. Doc. GA/7612/Add.1 (9 March
1988) at 5; ICI Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 21.
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ment, to take the matter to court.46 Such a presidential response would
have suspended the operation of the Anti-Terrorism Act, removed the
matter from the international agenda, and obviated debate in the General
Assembly or-adjudication in The Hague, all of which could only increase
the political costs to the United States. The Supreme Court, in all likeli-
hood, would have found that the case raised "political questions" and
was therefore non-justiciable. The Anti-Terrorism Act would have been
unimplementable, and the affair would have ended domestically, with
minimal international costs.
I do not mean to minimize the legal and political difficulties facing
Executive officials charged with applying ill-conceived domestic legisla-
tion that patently contravenes international law. Many considerations
must go into the officials' decisions and strategies. Each case must be
taken on its merits. The quandary is exacerbated because it is far from
certain that international law should always prevail. Some international
law is bad; in a system lacking a legislature to abrogate law, contrary
national legislation can be viewed as its belated termination. On the
other hand, some national law is bad and should be overruled by interna-
tional law. Choices must always be made.
In terms of the morals of personal choice, the decision of officials
asked to implement statutes violating international law, like the personal
decision of a citizen facing unjust laws, is difficult and sometimes peril-
ous.4 7 The implications for organizational efficacy are hardly negligible.
Superiors usually prefer an ethic of obedience. But legal systems built on
unquestioning obedience and defenses of superior orders are as danger-
ous as they are dehumanizing. It is precisely for this reason that democ-
racies are notoriously more difficult to manage, for they are comprised of
a community of morally autonomous and responsible citizens. The diffi-
culty goes with the turf. An escape from this dilemma is ultimately an
escape from freedom.
Thanks in no small part to the United States, contrary national legisla-
tion is no longer a defense for a violation of international law. In the
Justice case at Nuremberg, the indicted German judges proved that
"[u]nder the Nazi system, and even prior thereto, German judges were
also bound to apply German law even when in violation of the principles
46. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 432-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Senators have
standing to sue President to vindicate effectiveness of their vote).
47. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 206 (1961) ("the certification of
something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience ...."); Hart, Positiv-
ism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 615-21 (1958) ("the prob-
lem posed by morally evil laws"); Reisman, The Tormented Conscience: Applying and
Appraising Unauthorized Coercion, 32 EMORY L.J. 499 (1983).
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of international law." 48 If that practice had been a valid defense, there
would have been precious few convictions and scant humanitarian devel-
opment since that time. If the Justice Department, the New York Times,
and the professors are right and contrary national law is now a valid
defense to violations of international law, the international human rights
program is doomed.
Indeed, the most melancholy aspect in this part of the Mission affair
was the militantly parochial attitude that many of the American players
adopted toward international law and morality. For a moment, it was
difficult to believe this controversy was taking place at the end of the
twentieth century. Did not any of these players realize that as the inter-
national political system has become more interdependent, parts of inter-
national law have increasingly prescribed and sought to override
incompatible national law? Most of them know and, at one time or an-
other, some have even said that our democracy must find a way to ac-
commodate the need for governmental autonomy with the need for
restraint imposed by an increasingly urgent international law. Surely it is
now clear that in an interdependent planet, a notion of legality based
entirely on domestic institutions and requiring automatic compliance
with domestic directives, even when they violate common and accepted
international norms, involves a gravely pathological legal and moral au-
tism. Imagine foreign officials violating our international rights on the
ground that they are simply complying with their own subsequent legis-
lation. We reject such claims when invoked by officials of other govern-
ments. Do the Justice Department, the New York Times, and the
professors want a different standard for the United States?
III
There was yet a third villain. The International Court of Justice's per-
formance in this case is no less depressing than that of Congress and the
Executive. The essential question posed by the General Assembly to the
Court was not whether there was a dispute. The very fact that negotia-
tions between the United Nations and the United States were ongoing
presupposed the dispute's existence. The question posed to the Court by
the General Assembly here, as indeed in every case involving an arbitra-
tion clause, was whether, under the circumstances, the United States was
obliged to go to arbitration under section 21(a) of the Headquarters
Agreement.
48. Justice Case (U.S. v. Altstoetter), 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE Nu-
ERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 954, 1011 (1951).
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Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States concerning
the interpretation or application of this agreement or of any supplemental
agreement, which is not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of set-
tlement, shall be referred for final decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators
'49
. . . :4
This is an unusual clause for a number of reasons. First, instead of
permitting either party to initiate arbitration once a dispute erupts, as is
the usual practice, the clause appears to require that both parties agree to
refer the dispute to arbitration. This unusual provision appears to have
been designed to prevent a particular dispute from going to arbitration
unless both parties specifically agree to it. Consistent with this intention,
the Appointing Authority is not permitted to designate an arbitrator if
one of the parties refuses to appoint its own. Arbitral commitments that
do not provide for or permit the establishment of a tribunal when one of
the parties refuses to cooperate are sometimes referred to as "pathologi-
cal arbitral clauses."50 It would be a mistake to apply that term to this
case, for the parties plainly wished to require that both sides negotiate in
order to reach consent to a particular arbitration.
Both the United Nations and the United States appear to have ignored
these unusual features in the compromissory clause. The United Nations
claimed that, given an arbitration clause, once a dispute existed and one
party called for arbitration, the other party was obliged to arbitrate.5'
The United States did not really contest that point but claimed instead
that, notwithstanding the existence of a dispute, the critical question was
whether arbitration was appropriate at the particular moment at which
the United Nations requested it. The United States contended that
"[t]he United States will take no action to close the Mission pending a
decision in [the District Court] litigation. Since the matter is still pend-
ing in our courts, we do not believe arbitration would be apipropriate or
timely."52
Thus, the central legal question of the ICJ case was whether arbitra-
tion had to be compelled at the moment a dispute crystallized, or
49. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 2, § 21(a).
50. See generally Scalbert & Marville, Les Clauses Compromissoires Pathologiques, 1988
REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 117; Eisemann, La Clause d'Arbitrage Pathologique, in COMMER-
CIAL ARBITRATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORIAM EUGENIO MINOLI 129, 130 (1974) (arbitral
clause is "pathological" if it fails to fulfill its four essential functions: (1) to provide that
decisions will be binding on parties; (2) to make participation by state tribunals in settling
disagreements unnecessary; (3) to give power to arbitrators to settle all legal disputes which
might set one party against other; and (4) to put in place most efficient procedure for reaching
enforceable judgment).
51. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 21.




whether an international tribunal had some prudential discretion to de-
cide if arbitration was appropriate or timely. Only if it were found that
the tribunal could exercise prudential discretion would the Court reach
the factual question of whether the circumstances of the particular case
warranted its exercise.
The Court rejected the United States' legal contention:
The Court could not allow considerations as to what might be "appropri-
ate" to prevail over the obligations which derive from section 21 of the
Headquarters Agreement, as "the Court, being a Court of justice, cannot
disregard rights recognized by it, and base its decisions on considerations of
pure expediency."' 53
The ICJ quotes from and relies on Free Zones, a 1930 case concerning a
dispute between France and Switzerland over the free zones of Haute-
Savoie and the District of Gex. When the French Government decided
to suppress the free zones, Switzerland protested, proposing that the mat-
ter be referred to the PCIJ or to some other arbitral tribunal. The case
came before the PCIJ in three phases. The orders from both the first and
the second phases required the parties to negotiate between themselves.
The quotation which the ICJ took from the second phase of the Free
Zones case creates the impression that a jurisprudence of more than fifty
years holds that, in determining whether to compel arbitration, the Court
is precluded from considering prudential factors such as the appropriate-
ness and timeliness of arbitration in the particular dispute. This is the
exact opposite, however, of what the Permanent Court in Free Zones
actually said; by the use of selective quotation, the ICJ misstated its own
precedent. Consider the precise words of the Permanent Court in Free
Zones:
[A]nd although the Court, being a Court of justice, cannot disregard rights
recognized by it, and base its decision on considerations of pure expediency,
nevertheless there is nothing to prevent it, having regard to the advantages
which a [negotiated] solution of this kind might present, to offer the Parties,
who alone can bring it about, a further opportunity for achieving this end.54
The Permanent Court had actually said that a court does have the discre-
tion to determine, even after a dispute has crystallized, whether the ap-
propriate moment has arrived to proceed to a third-party decision or
whether further inter-party negotiations are in order.
53. Id. at 29 (quoting Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Second Phase)
(Fr. v. Switz.), 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 15 (Dec. 6)).
54. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Second Phase) (Fr. v. Switz.),
1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 15 (Dec. 6) (emphasis added).
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If the ICJ had presented its own case law correctly, it would have
proceeded to explore whether national legislation which is inconsistent
with some international obligation represents a per se violation of that
obligation., In a separate opinion that garnered no other support from his
brethren on the Court, Judge Elias said that such legislation does violate
the international obligation, 55 but his position raises both factual and
legal difficulties.
What we might call "self-executing legislation"-legislation which
does not incorporate or allow for national judicial participation and,
hence, review-may be viewed, all things being equal, as an accom-
plished violation of international law at the moment it contravenes it.
Thus, were Congress to legislate that no officer of the PLO is to be given
a visa to enter the United States, notwithstanding any other law or inter-
national commitment to which the United States is a party, that law
would be, effectively, self-executing. Were Chairman Arafat to present
himself at the U.S. Embassy's Consular Division in Berne, Switzerland
and request a visa to attend the General Assembly as titular head of a
Permanent Observer, the visa would not be issued and ipso facto section
11 of the Headquarters Agreement would be violated.56
But under the terms of the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, the closure of
the Permanent Mission of the PLO was not self-executing. Section 1004
contemplated taking "necessary legal action to effectuate the policies and
provisions" of the Act and instructed the Attorney General to take that
action.57 The Act specifically designated the Federal District Courts as
the appropriate fora for the legal action. In this respect, the Anti-Terror-
ism Act presented a distinctly different international legal problem than
did Secretary of State Shultz's lamentable decision to refuse a visa to
Yasir Arafat, an invitee of the General Assembly, in December, 1988.58
Shultz's act was a self-executing violation of the Headquarters Agree-
ment in that it was, effectively, the final U.S. decision. The Anti-Terror-
ism Act was not.
In international law, non-self-executing national legislation which is
inconsistent with the international obligations of the state enacting the
55. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 10, at 36 (declaration by Judge Elias).
56. This, of course, is no mere hypothetical situation. See infra note 58.
57. Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 14, § 1004(a) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 5203(a) (West
Supp. 1988)).
58. For discussion of the denial of a visa to Arafat and the State Department's reasons for
the denial, see Statement Denying Visa for Arafat, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1988, at A5, col. 1;
United States Representative to the Committee of Relations with the Host Country, Press
Release No. USUN 154-(88) (Nov. 28, 1988) (Statement by Patricia M. Byrne); see also Reis-
man, The Arafat Visa Affair Exceeding the Bounds of Host State Discretion, 83 AM. J. INT'L




legislation is not deemed to be a violation until the law is implemented.
International case law on this point is remarkably consistent. In the
Mariposa Development Company case before the United States and Pana-
manian General Claims Commission of 1926, the Commission said:' -
Practical common sense indicates that the mere passage of an act under
which private property may later be expropriated without compensation by
judicial or executive action should not at once create an international claim
on behalf of every alien property holder in the country. There should be a
locus penitentiae for diplomatic representation and executive forbearance,
and claims should arise only when actual confiscation follows.59
The same point was adopted by the Permanent Court in the case con-
cerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia: "[T]he Court
is certainly not called upon to interpret the Polish law as such: but there
is nothing to prevent the Court's giving judgment on the question
whether or not, in applying that law, Poland is acting in conformity with
its obligations towards Germany under the Geneva Convention." '60
In 1962, the European Court of Human Rights in the De Becker case
said:
[T]he Court is not called upon, under Articles 19 and 25 of the [Geneva]
Convention, to give a decision on an abstract problem relating to the com-
patibility of that Act with the provisions of the Convention, but on the
specific case of the application of such an Act to the Applicant and to the
extent to which the latter would, as a result, be prevented from exercising
one of the rights guaranteed by the Convention . 61
In Application Number 290/57 against Ireland and 867/60 against Nor-
way, the European Commission on Human Rights held:
[T]he Commission is competent to examine the compatibility of domestic
legislation with the Convention only with respect to its application to a
person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals and only
insofar as its application is alleged to constitute a violation of the Conven-
tion in regard to the applicant person, organization or group in question
62
59. Mariposa Development Company (U.S. v. Pan.), United States and Panamanian Gen-
eral Claims Arbitration 573, 6 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 338, 341 (1933).
60. Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Ger. v. Po1.), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. A)
No. 7, at 19 (May 25) (emphasis added).
61. De Becker Case, 1962 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 320, 334-36 (Eur. Ct. Hum.
Rts.).
62. X v. Ireland, 1960 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HuM. RTs. 214, 220 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum
Rts.); X v. Norway, 1961 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUM. RTS. 270, 276 (Eur. Comm'n on Hum.
Rts.).
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After a comprehensive review of state practice, international judicial de-
cisions and the writings of scholars, the International Law Commission
concluded in 1977:
[I]n the case of international obligations requiring the State to achieve a
result in concreto but leaving it free to do so by means of its own choice, the
fact that a State bound by such an obligation has adopted a measure or, in
particular, enacted a law constituting in abstracto an obstacle to the
achievement of the required result, is not yet a breach or even the beginning
of a breach of the obligation in question. There will be a breach only if the
State is found to have failed in concreto to achieve the result required by the
obligation.63
Thus, the legal conclusion of the ICJ is quite inconsistent with interna-
tional law and its own jurisprudence.
As a legal matter, the Court had the discretion to determine whether
the opportune moment to compel arbitration had arrived. As a factual
matter, there were good reasons for finding arbitration premature. First,
the Anti-Terrorism Act required the collaboration of American courts
for its implementation. The matter was in court, and no action could be
taken against the Mission until the adjudication was concluded. More-
over, the ICJ was familiar with the independence of the U.S. judiciary.
Indeed, in the Interhandel case in 1959,64 the Court deferred the Swiss
claim against the United States although the matter had been in U.S.
legal processes since 1942 and in U.S. courts since 1948! To the Swiss
claim that U.S. courts would ignore international law and, instead, fol-
low the domestic Trading with the Enemy Act, the International Court
replied: "[T]he decisions of the United States courts bear witness to the
fact that United States courts are competent to apply international law in
their decisions when necessary. ' '65 And indeed in the PLO case, the U.S.
judiciary, through the beneficent actions of Judge Palmieri, did resolve
the matter at the national level, making arbitration unnecessary.
I believe that there were compelling reasons of law and fact for the
International Court to find that the matter was not ripe and to suspend
the process until the domestic court action had concluded. Such a deci-
sion would not have been politically popular with the General Assembly,
but that is hardly a criterion of justice. In my view, not only did the
Court do the improper thing; it did it in the wrong way, impairing its
own discretion in future cases which may present comparable problems,
and injuring its reputation for reliability.
63. Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Twenty-Ninth
Session, [1977] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 26.
64. Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6 (Preliminary Objections) (March 21).





The only character to emerge honorably out of this otherwise dismay-
ing farce was Judge Palmieri. He concluded that the Anti-Terrorism Act
was valid but that it did not override the Headquarters Agreement either
by its terms or intention.66 While the opinion seems consistent with the
treaty corollary of the "last in time" rule, it should be seen, if read in
context, to be a bid to increase significantly the discretion of the courts to
refuse to implement subsequent legislation which, in their view, is incon-
sistent with a prior treaty commitment.
Judge Palmieri reaffirmed the old doctrine that it was permissible for
Congress to have intended to violate the Headquarters Agreement. Had
this intention only been clear, reasoned Palmieri, other branches of the
Government would have been obliged to implement it. The formal rea-
soning of Judge Palmieri's opinion posits that there was a legitimate
question about the precise intention of the Anti-Terrorism Act. It is pre-
sumed that the legislators would not have intended to violate the treaty;
the treaty prevailed because, according to Palmieri, the intention to the
contrary was not absolutely manifest.
Judge Palmieri refashioned the "last in time" rule in a way which
pushed the threshold of incompatibility extremely high.67 He referred to
the discussion of the "last in time" rule in the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States68 as reflecting an "unbroken
line of authority. '69 He quoted section 115(1)(a) of the Restatement as
follows:
An Act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the
purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear and if the
act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.70
The judge actually misquotes the Restatement. The American Law Insti-
tute's text actually reads: "if the purpose of the act to supersede the
earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provi-
sion cannot be fairly reconciled. '71 The Restatement set the threshold of
66. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 88 Civ. 1962, slip op. at 35 (S.D.N.Y.
June 29, 1988).
67. I am indebted to Steven Hartmann, Yale J.D. '90, for permitting me to read his (as yet
unpublished) paper entitled Reconsidering the Last in Time Rule, in which he explores the
discrepancy between the text of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States and Judge Palmieri's opinion.
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
69. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., slip op. at 21.
70. Id. (emphasis is Judge Palmieri's).
71. RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 115 (emphasis added).
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incompatibility relatively low, giving courts two options: They could de-
rive a possible inconsistency from either the text or the intention. By
insisting on the conjunction of text and intention before concluding that
a statute is inconsistent with a previous treaty, Judge Palmieri has made
it even harder to establish an inconsistency.
The requirement that congressional intention to override prior treaties
be manifest has always been a part of the "last in time" cases; until the
PLO case, it has been possible to satisfy the requirement. Congress, it
will be recalled, had cast its net widely, neither using ambiguous lan-
guage nor concealing its intentions in enacting the Anti-Terrorism Act:
It would henceforth be unlawful "notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary" for the PLO to maintain "an office, headquarters, prem-
ises, or other facilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the
United States .... "72 If this language did not convey an intention with
sufficient clarity, then it is difficult to imagine what language could.
Consider one example, for purposes of contrast. In 1971, Congress, at
the initiative of Senator Robert Byrd, set out to stop the U.S. embargo on
trade with Southern Rhodesia,73 imposed in order to comply with Secur-
ity Council Resolution 232.74 Section 10 of the Byrd Amendment to the
Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act 75 stated in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... the President may not
prohibit or regulate the importation into the United States of any material
determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions of this
subchapter, if such material is the product of any foreign country or area
not listed as a Communist-dominated country or area... for so long as the
importation into the United States of material of that kind which is the
product of such Communist-dominated countries or areas is not prohibited
by any provision of law.76
In Diggs v. Shultz, Judge McGowan said:
We think that there can be no blinking the purpose and effect of the Byrd
Amendment. It was to detach this country from the U.N. boycott of
Southern Rhodesia in blatant disregard of our treaty undertakings. The
legislative record shows that no member of Congress voting on the measure
72. Anti-Terrorism Act, supra note 14, § 1003(3) (codified at 22 U.S.C.A. § 5202(3) (West
Supp. 1988)).
73. See Exec. Order No. 11,322, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1967), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A. § 287c app.
at 254-56 (1979); Exec. Order No. 11,419, 3 C.F.R. 125 (1968), reprinted in 22 U.S.C.A.
§ 287c app. at 256-57 (1979). Both of these Executive Orders were later revoked by Exec.
Order No. 12,183, 3 C.F.R. 472 (1979), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 287c app. at 110 (1982).
74. S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR RESOLUTIONS AND DECISioNs at 7, U.N. Doc. No. S1
INF/21/Rev. 1 (1966).
75. 50 U.S.C. §§ 98 to 98h-4 (1982).




was under any doubt about what was involved then; and no amount of
statutory interpretation now can make the Byrd Amendment other than
what it was as presented to the Congress, namely, a measure which would
make-and was intended to make-the United States a certain treaty
violator.77
Judge McGowan found that the "notwithstanding" clause demonstrated
congressional intention to violate the international obligation. Judge Pal-
mieri's threshold of intention, in contrast, allows a court to find, in virtu-
ally any case, that there is some doubt about intention.
Like Zeno's paradox, in which the distance between points A and B is
infinitely divisible such that one can "theoretically" never reach B from
A, the theory underlying this part of the PLO case is that there is always
a higher level of potential specificity. If the legislature does not adopt
that higher level, its formulation of intent is ambiguous and the presump-
tion against an intention to violate international law prevails. Hence-
forth, the game is played in a new way. If a future act should say instead:
"notwithstanding any other international agreement . . . " a court may
note that the Headquarters Agreement is not strictly an international
agreement, for the United Nations is not a nation. If an act should say:
"notwithstanding the Headquarters Agreement.. . ," a court could still
respond that the practice in question is grounded in custom and not ex-
clusively on the text of the agreement. And so on. The game stops only
in the unlikely case that a legislative considerandum says expressis verbis:
"It is our firm and unequivocal intention to violate international law."
Even the most brazen law-breakers avoid such self-incriminations.
I submit that the PLO case imports an innovative judicial approach.
Even when congressional intention is manifest, federal courts, as an in-
dependent Branch, will decide whether or not to give effect to congres-
sional interventions in foreign affairs accomplished through unilateral
terminations of treaties. The situation does not mean that every treaty
will be sustained against subsequent legislation; rather, it means that in
case of a conflict between international law and subsequent national leg-
islation, the Judiciary will conduct an independent review of the issues,
policies, and consequences. If this jurisprudence endures, we may antici-
pate that some treaties will survive subsequent contrary legislation, and
77. 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied 411 U.S. 931. In Diggs v. Shultz, the
circuit court recognized that a conflict existed between the 1971 statute authorizing importa-
tion by the United States of metallurgical chromite from Southern Rhodesia and an earlier
U.N. resolution imposing an embargo on trade with South Rhodesia. The court viewed con-
gressional power to set aside treaty obligations as settled constitutional doctrine: "Under our
constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do so, and there is noth-
ing the other branches of government can do about it." Id.
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that others will not. Unfortunately, the PLO case did not make explicit
the methodology and criteria necessary for deciding these types of issues.
We must now look to higher courts for doctrinal illumination.
Insofar as other courts accept and use the PLO decision, we will wit-
ness a belated assertion and application of the constitutionally-accorded
competence of the courts to play an active role in this aspect of the for-
eign affairs power. Until now, courts have been reticent in this regard,
but given the increased power which Congress has assumed in foreign
affairs, a more determined mediating role by the courts may be a neces-
sary counter-balance. Because the Executive may sometimes exercise its
independent powers and refuse to defer to the congressional will, a more
active judiciary will not only contribute to order but may lead to a more
constitutionally-healthy political process.
V
The best that may be said is that the PLO Mission affair ended without
an effective violation of international law. In this limited sense, it ended
well. But all is not well that ends well.
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